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ESSAY
SHAW v. RENO: ON THE BORDERLINE*
In 1992, North Carolina submitted-and the Justice Department approved-a
new congressional district. District 12 stretches approximately 160 miles
along Interstate Highway 85. For much of its length, it is "no wider than
the 1-85 corridor. It winds in snake-like -fashion through tobacco country,
financial centers, and manufacturing areas .. . [dividing towns and coun-
ties]. At one point the district remains contiguous only because it intersects
at a single point with two other districts before crossing over them."' The
boundaries of District 12 were drawn so that it would encompass sufficient
African-Americans to constitute a majority-minority district. Five white
North Carolina voters challenged the validity of District 12 on a variety of
constitutional grounds. In Shaw v. Reno, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the plaintiffs had asserted a valid constitutional claim that
should be heard on the merits.
2
This essay is about aspiration and reality in civil rights litigation. The opin-
ions in Shaw v. Reno provide the context for my comments. They illustrate both
the poverty of constitutional analysis bereft of clear aspiration and the danger of
constitutional aspiration divorced from reality.
Aspiration and reality work in tandem in civil rights cases: the discrepancy
between the two is the measure of a civil rights plaintiff's harm. Because a civil
rights plaintiff's reality is not always well understood-or perhaps because her aspi-
rations differ from those historically accorded constitutional significance-a civil
rights complaint does not always allege harms that fit neatly within boundaries
prescribed by conventional causes of action.
The measure of the general vitality of our civil rights is the Constitution's
ability to accommodate new realities and aspirations that together-in their lack of
* Emily Calhoun, Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
1. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2820-21 (1993).
2. Id. at 2832.
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"fit"-constitute a civil rights plaintiff's harms. 3 Without an accommodating
Constitution, for example, the right to educational equality recognized in Brown
v. Board of Education4 might not exist;5 neither, perhaps, would an abortion right
based on the feminist reality that, in making a decision about abortion, women
"define . . .[their] concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life" 6 an activity essential to one's very "personhood."7
Shaw v. Reno only partially honors the unique role played by aspiration and
reality within the domain of civil rights disputes. The decision was based on the
majority's willingness to recognize unusual harms-harms described as the plain-
tiffs described them, from the plaintiffs' point of view-despite the fact that, the
harms did not seem to fit neatly within an analytical framework prescribed by tra-
ditional voting rights cases. On the other hand, however, Shaw threatens impor-
tant civil rights victories: a districting which led to the election of the first two
African-American representatives from North Carolina since Reconstruction and,
if its language and reasoning are read carelessly, federal voting rights legislation. It
seems deliberately to ignore the realities and aspirations-and, therefore, the civil
rights harms-of African-Americans in the political process.
Shaw has provoked substantial criticism, some well taken
8 and some not. 9
But critics uniformly fail to acknowledge any similarity between the claims of
harm made by the Shaw plaintiffs and claims typically made by voting rights
plaintiffs. They do not see that Shaw provides a foundation for expanded consti-
tutional protections for rights of minority political participation.
This essay proceeds on the simple premise that we can learn valuable things
about constitutional protection for voting rights by looking at Shaw from the per-
spective of the plaintiffs who brought the lawsuit, by accepting the plaintiffs as
legitimate voting rights plaintiffs, and by refusing to dismiss cavalierly the validity
of their description of the political realities and constitutional aspirations that
3. The role of aspiration in constitutional interpretation has been described by others. See,
e.g., PHIuP BoBBirr, CONSTITTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991). See general RONALD DWORKIN,
LIFE's DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDMDUAL FREEDOM
(1993). According to Bobbitt, constitutional aspiration is not merely an interpretive fallback to
gaps in our understanding of the intent of the Constitution's framers. It is how we manage to
effect a "recursion to conscience," to preserve ourselves as a democracy through "'constantly
renewfingl . . .spiritual and moral self-consciousness.'" BOBerrr, supra, at 183-84 (quoting Thomas
Mann). In civil rights adjudication, aspirations frequently appear more as benchmarks of possible
harm rather than as specific doctrinal rules.' Se e.g., the way in which the concurrence invoked
the principle of no taxation without representation in Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 58-81
(1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. See genaralbp PETER C. HOFFER, THE LAW'S CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONAUSM
IN AMERICA (1990).
6. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992).
7. Id.
8. See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text discussing the majority's neglect of the
realities of racial politics.
9. For example, the well-known criticism repeated by Jeffrey Rosen, Gerrymandered, NEW
REPUBuc, Oct. 25, 1993, at 12 ("[tlhe only constitutional value that O'Connor identifies is an
aesthetic value") is simply wrong. See infra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
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defined their harms. 10 Specifically, we can find in Shaw a doctrinal basis for pro-
tecting broad rights of minority political participation. And we can see the
urgent need for civil rights advocates to rethink and more clearly explain the aspi-
ration to equality on which so many civil rights victories depend.
A. Constitutional Harms and Voting Rights Plaintifi
The Shaw plaintiffs' claims were based on several constitutional provisions.
They argued that Article I, Section 2, of the Constitution, as well as the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, each establish "a right...
not to have 'the people divided' [for purposes of elections for United States repre-
sentatives] . . . 'along racial lines."'11 They maintained that the North Carolina
legislature acted unconstitutionally by its "intentional concentration of majority
populations of black voters in districts that are in no way related to considerations
of compactness, contiguousness, or jurisdictional communities of interest." 12
They insisted that the injury of which they complained was "suffered alike by
'plaintiffs and all other citizens and registered voters of North Carolina-whether
black, white, native American, or others."' 13 In making their allegations, they did
not identify themselves as white.
The district court faithfully recorded the plaintiffs' allegations of harm but it
seemed unable to truly hear them. It was "puzzled" that the allegations did not
tie the plaintiffs, their harms, or their rights to membership in a particular racial
group.14  Unable to cope with allegations of unconventional harms, it chose to
transform the allegations by taking judicial notice of the race of the'plaintiffs.15
Having effected this transformation, the court was able to analyze the complaint
as if it presented a traditional vote dilution claim. Not surprisingly, the com-
plaint did not contain allegations that would satisfy traditional vote dilution stan-
dards. Thus, the court concluded, the complaint should be dismissed.
The Shaw plaintiffs suffered a fate that minority voting rights plaintiffs
would surely recognize. For example, when minority plaintiffs first alleged group
harms that were effectively invisible to courts blinkered by conventional voting
rights doctrine, their claims were rejected. 16 They knew, however, that the success
of their struggle to secure more meaningful protection for minority voting rights
10, The perspective and claims are those embodied in the official record. I do not pretend to
know what political or other motives may have driven the plaintiffs to file suit. For purposes of
exploring the ideas offered in this article, they are irrelevant.
11. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 469 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (three-judge court) (quoting from the
Complaint).
12. Id. at 465 (citing to the Prayer for Relief).
13. Id. at 470 (quoting from the Complaint).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See, eg., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) (the back-and-forth analysis reflects the
Court's incomplete understanding of group-based voting rights claims).
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depended on their ability to secure judicial recognition of new constitutional
harms. In particular, they fought to secure recognition that the right to vote may
be unconstitutionally infringed by procedures or structures that affect the politi-
cal power of minorities as a group-even when those procedures or structures in no
way interfere with the ability of any individual to register as a voter or to cast a
ballot.
Minority plaintiffs ultimately secured this recognition in decisions like White
17 1V. Regester and Rogers v. Lodge. 8  In White and Rogers, African-Americans were
given a vote but could only cast it in multimember district elections that mini-
mized the collective influence of African-Americans. 19 By recognizing group-
based constitutional claims, the Supreme Court refused to ignore a simple reality
of political life: individual minority voting rights are not meaningful if the collec-
tive political power of the minority group is obstructed. 20 It also endorsed expan-
sive constitutional aspirations for the right to vote. Although the Court did not
clearly link its aspiration to an explicit textual source, the right "preservative of all
[other] rights"2 1 was given strong protection.
Over time, however, the Court's group-oriented voting rights decisions came
to stand for a limiting rather than an expansive view of voting rights harms.
22
Districting was assumed to threaten one and only one kind of voting rights harm-
-harm to the power of groups to elect representatives stemming from persistent
patterns of racial bloc voting. This assumption, at the heart of "vote dilution"
claims, has been reinforced by amendments to and interpretations of Sections 2
and 5 of the Voting Rights Act.23  The Shaw plaintiffs ran head-on into this
assumption in the district court, which was so wedded to the assumption that it
felt compelled to transform the plaintiffs' allegations. In the Supreme Court,
however, the majority took the plaintiffs' allegations of harm at face value, as
alleged, and rejected the validity of the assumption.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, maintained that Shaw was about
the "complex and sensitive" issue of "the meaning of the constitutional 'right' to
17. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
18. 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
19. See supra notes 17-18.
20. Justice Souter's dissent in Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2845-49, contains a good description of the
Court's extension of voting rights protections to groups.
21. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). See generally Emily Calhoun, The First
Amendment and Distributional Voting Rights Controversies, 52 TENN. L REv. 549 (1985)
(discussing the consequences of the Court's failure to tie the right to an explicit textual source).
22. Cf. Lani Guinier, Voting Rights and Democratic Theory: nhere Do We Go From Here?, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS Acr IN PERSPECTIVE 283 (Bernard
Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1993) (Challenges to multimember districts are merely
"remedial" and are unable to fulfill the "broad-based participatory and transformative politics
implicit in the original vision of the civil rights movement. ').
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988). See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Pros:
The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MIcH. L REv. 1833 (1992) (describing the
evolution of vote dilution analysis).
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vote," 24 even though the plaintiffs asserted neither group-based harms nor indi-
vidual vote deprivation. She accepted the plaintiffs' decision not to complain that
North Carolina's "reapportionment plan unconstitutionally 'diluted' white voting
strength" 25 but rather to argue that they had a "constitutional right to participate
in a 'color-blind' electoral process."
26
Using the claimed right as an aspirational point of reference, O'Connor
maintained that the harms flowing from racial gerrymanders are "special harms
... not present in our vote-dilution cases." 27 District 12 was said to threaten harm
to a goal of achieving a multiracial society that is not divided or balkanized,
28
harm to a system of representative government in which interests of the whole
constituency rather than a particular racial group are taken into account,29 harm
to a goal of minimizing racial bloc voting,30 and harm to the obligation of elected
representatives to be accountable to more than a particular racial constituency.
31
For the most part, these harms would be felt by any citizen whose constitu-
tional aspirations include a government in which elected representatives owe a
constitutionally-rooted obligation to work for the entire community but whose
representative in fact has only the constitutionally-irrelevant criterion of race to
identify the community to which he (the representative) will hold himself
accountable. The harms would be felt by persons whose aspirations for citizen-
ship include membership in a political "community"-neither a majoritarian nor a
minority special-interest group-but who in fact live in a district that by virtue of
its structure will preclude any realistic possibility of achieving community.
32
The dissenters in Shaw had different views of the plaintiffs' allegations of
harm. As did the district court, Justice White believed the Shaw facts "mirrored]
those presented in [vote dilution cases]."33 He did not understand or share a con-
24. 113 S. Ct. at 2819.
25. Id. at 2821, 2824.
26. Id. at 2824.
27. Id. at 2828.
28. Id. at 2827, 2832.
29. Id. at 2827-28 (citing Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376
U.S. 52, 66-67 (1964)).
30. Id. at 2827.
31. Id. at 2827-28.
32. That the harms identified by O'Connor have their source in aspirations for representative
government that work for the common good is confirmed by O'Connor's citation to Justice
Douglas's reminder that in elections, "communities" (not individual voters) ideally seek the best
representative, not the best racially or religiously partisan advocate. 113 S. Ct. at 2827 (quoting
Justice Douglas's dissent in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 67 (1964)). See also infra notes 62-68
and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of the constitutional nature of this aspiration.
As Shaw itself implicitly attests, rarely are government structures likely to inherently
preclude representation on behalf of the community. For example, the Court's vote dilution
decisions repeatedly state that there is nothing intrinsically unconstitutional about multimember
districts. See Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973). If
race is not the sole criterion but only a significant one of many factors used, a Section 2 majority-
minority district would not inherently preclude the possibility of community. This view is
arguably suggested in Shaw by the majority's note that Shaw does not address the more typical
Section 2 district, in which race is merely one (albeit a significant one) of many factors taken into
account.
33. 113 S. Ct. at 2834.
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cern about harms flowing from artificial political communities. In his view, the
majority did no more than hold that of "two districts drawn on similar, race-based
grounds .... one... become[s] more injurious than the other simply by virtue of
being snake-like . . . ."34 He accused the majority of focusing on "superficiali-
ties" 35 rather than on real harms flowing from exclusion and the inability of
minority groups to achieve a meaningful "voice in the political process."
36
Justice Stevens maintained that constitutional harm arises from a breach of a
"duty to govern impartially [which] is abused when a group with power over the
electoral process defines electoral boundaries solely to enhance its own political
strength at the expense of any weaker group." 37 If the group in power acts "to
facilitate the election of a member of a group that lacks ...power because it
remains underrepresented," as the white-dominated North Carolina legislature
did in creating District 12, there is no breach of duty.
38
Justice Souter interpreted the Court's vote dilution cases to set forth a nar-
row exception to the general principle that the Constitution protects against only
direct deprivations of individual voting rights.39  The Shaw plaintiffs did not
allege the type of harms recognized in vote dilution cases, and Justice Souter saw
no individual harm linked to District 12. In districting, he stated, "the mere
placement of an individual in one district instead of another denies no one a
right or benefit provided to others"40 even if the placement is on the basis of race.
In a footnote, he acknowledged the validity of an aspiration to representative
democracy that works for the benefit of all, but had "difficulty seeing how [the
aspiration] is threatened (indeed why it is not, rather, enhanced) by districts that
are not even alleged to dilute anyone's vote."
41
Although the dissenting opinions do not offer precisely the same analysis, all
dissenting Justices are primarily concerned with aspirations of political equality
derived from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
with the discrepancy between those aspirations and the realities of racial poli-
tics.42 That discrepancy, although not one that mattered to the Shaw plaintiffs,
34, Id. at 2841.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2843.
37. Id. at 2844.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2845.49. Justice Souter's approach-like O'Connor's-treats voting rights cases as
unique. O'Connor sees them as unique'in the harms they can entail for the political process of
representative democracy. Souter, however, sees them as unique in the Court's willingness to
recognize group harms. SeegenerallyJustice Souter's concurrence. Id.
40. 113 S. Ct. at 2846.
41. Id. at 2848.49 n.9.
42. Justice Blackmun's short opinion simply reflects an aspiration to see African-Americans
elected from North Carolina. Id. at 2843.
[Vol. 65
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defined the only harms the dissenting Justices were willing to consider.4 3 Because,
under North Carolina's districting plan, whites-seventy-nine percent of the voting
population-would constitute a voting majority in eighty-three percent of the
state's congressional districts, the Shaw plaintiffs could make no claim of harm
recognized by the dissenters.
The Shaw majority is accused of "imagining an entirely new cause of
action" 44 and of inappropriately expanding the types of harms redressable
through voting rights litigation. These accusations are exaggerated.45 The harms
alleged by the Shaw plaintiffs have been recognized and their aspirational bench-
mark appears in other voting rights decisions. This is true even of the early vote
dilution decisions.
46
The aspirational benchmark more recently appeared in Davis v. Bandemer,47 a
non-racial gerrymandering case. In Davis, the plaintiffs' harms were linked by a
majority of Justices to a constitutional aspiration of "fair and effective representa-
tion."48 Speaking for himself and three other Justices, Justice White said that the
Constitution protects against a diminished ability of constituent groups "to secure
the attention of the winning candidate."49 Although he was unwilling to presume
43. It should be noted that, although the Shaw majority's approach to harm differs from the
dissents', even the majority opinion remains faithful to the Court's historical practice of analyzing
voting rights claims under conventional equal protection doctrine. O'Connor's decision to stick
with equal protection language is unfortunate. It tends to confuse the analysis and to obscure the
nature of the Shaw plaintiffs' harms. More importantly, it does nothing to help ensure that, in the
next voting rights case, conventional equal protection doctrine will not inappropriately obscure
real constitutional harms.
44. 113 S. Ct. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting).
45. Constitutionally-cognizable harms may come in a variety of shapes and forms in voting
cases. For example, in a number of districting cases plaintiffs' harms are related to a deprivation of
influence rather than an inability to elect representatives. See, eg., Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S.
52 (1964); c Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993) (assuming without deciding that an
influence-dilution claim could be based on Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act). Voinovich
exemplifies a recurring confusion about the nature of the harms asserted by voting rights plaintiffs.
Although assuming Section 2 authorizes influence-dilution claims, the Court nonetheless required
plaintiffs asserting such claims to prove that whites vote sufficiently as a bloc to defeat minority-
preferred candidates. One might well argue that white crossover voting strengthens, rather than
undercuts, an influence-dilution claim.
46. In the early districting cases, plaintiffs alleged harms associated with general exclusion
from the political community, an exclusion that seemed to have more to do with unresponsive
government and the deprivation of government benefits enjoyed by others than with any other
factor. Concerns about this aspect of exclusion figured prominently in the "totality of
circumstances" test of White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973). Issacharoff, supm note 23, at 1884,
argues that current vote dilution doctrine can be viewed merely as "an evidentiary proxy for the
cumbersome examination of the responsiveness of governmental institutions to the needs of all
citizens." One might argue, for example, that the only difference between White v. Regester and
Shaw v. Reno is that in White the minority plaintiffs had to introduce evidence that mu timember
districts undercut representative democracy-since multimember districts (originally adopted as
good government measures intended to counteract special interest government) are not per se
unconstitutional-while the Sbaw plaintiffs were permitted to rely on a presumption that a district
constructed onbp with respect to race will intrinsically undercut representative democracy.
47. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
48. Id. at 170 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Justice White's
opinion, the principle is expressed as "political fairness." See, e.g., id. at 131. The notion of fairness-
as-responsiveness embodied in Davis should not be confused with fairness-as-proportional-
representation. The latter concept of fairness is conventionally associated with vote dilution
analysis. See; eg., Timothy G. O'Rourke, Te 1982 Amendments and the Voting Rights Paradox, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 22, at 85.
49. 478 U.S. at 133.
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that "those who are elected will disregard [a] disproportionately underrepresented
group,"50 he would recognize a claim based on evidence that the electoral system
"is arranged in a manner that . . . consistently degrade[s] ...influence on the
political process as a whole."51 Justices Powell and Stevens concurred, but were a
little less willing than Justice White to presume that representatives in gerryman-
dered districts take into account all constituent groups. They expressed concern
that artificially gerrymandered districts would interfere with the ability of citizens
to associate effectively for purposes of democratic government. 52 They acknowl-
edged that harm might be caused by political structures incompatible with the for-
mulation of policies reflecting community interests.
5 3
The Justices in Davis did not characterize the primary harms resulting from
artificially gerrymandered districts in terms of a group's inability to elect a repre-
sentative. Rather, they spoke of harms suffered when an elected representative has
no practical incentive or reason in principle to represent any persons other than a
subset of constituents.5 4 The harms exist when there is a discrepancy between the
aspiration of representation benefiting the common good and the real conse-
quences of political structures that by their very nature obstruct any possibility of
achieving that representation. 55 The harms are those identified in Shaw.
B. Aspiration and Reality in Shaw v. Reno
It is difficult to explain the differences between the Shaw majority and dis-
senting opinions in terms of specific constitutional doctrine. Justice White-who
has consistently emphasized the failure of representatives to respond to the needs
of all constituents as a telling factor in challenges to multi-member districts 5-
50. Id. at 132 (people who vote for a losing candidate are "usually deemed to be adequately
represented by the winning candidate and to have as much opportunity to influence that candidate
as other voters in the district").
51. Id. See also Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 670-71 (N.D. Cal. 1988), affd mem., 488 U.S.
1024 (1989) (plaintiffs must show that the majority will entirely ignore the interests of the
minority).
52. 478 U.S. at 173 n.13.
53. Id. at 177-78. They expressed concern that districting might send a message to citizens
that representation or government is simply a game of power politics. Id.
54. Id.
55. Compare special district cases like Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981). In these cases, the
Court has recognized an exception to the artificial community concern. Special districts are
artificial communities in which voting rights are distributed based on an assumption that
representatives have no obligation to the general resident populace. Perhaps this is because special
districts have no general powers over the resident population. Should such powers exist-and
residents generally feel impacts of the powers of special district government-a constitutional
principle of reciprocity-as-fairness would arguably demand extension of the franchise. See
discussion in Calhoun, supra note 21, at 572-76.
56. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
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rejected the claim of similar harms in Shaw.57 Justice Rehnquist-in a completely
uncharacteristic move-was willing to recognize a constitutional harm of the
broadest and most amorphous sort.58 Justice Stevens-who argued in Davis that
"artificial communities" pose a justiciable voting rights claim and who was not
willing to assume that representatives elected from gerrymandered districts would
always respond to the interests of all district constituents5 9-criticized Justice
O'Connor for placing so much weight on the artificial construct of District 12.60
The opinions in Shaw are better explained in terms of the constitutional aspi-
rations they recognize and the realities they accord significance. The majority
opinion rests on aspirations for representative government for the benefit of the
common good as opposed to special-interest constituencies. 61 The aspirations are
not usefully labeled either liberal or conservative. 62 They were espoused by James
Madison, who saw representative democracy as a guard against potential dangers
of majority rule and as a mechanism for promoting the common good.63 They
are also historically associated with Thomas Jefferson's belief that public virtue
57. 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2834 (1993). Justice White was, however, consistent with his position in
United Jewish Org., Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). In UJO, White forced the Hasidic Jews'
complaint into a conventional vote-dilution mold. Ignoring the fact that the complaint
characterized harms in terms of the Jewish community rather than whites as a whole, he focused
his analysis of harms on impacts on white voters. The challenged districting plan did not
stigmatize whites, did not fence whites out of elections, and did not cancel out the voting strength
of a white racial voting bloc. Therefore, he concluded, white voters were fairly represented as a
group in the legislature and no harms to be redressed existed.
58. 113 S. Ct. at 2823. For example, Justice Rehnquist joined Justice White in finding no
constitutionally-cognizable harm to the plaintiffs in United Jewish Org., Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S.
144 (1977). While White adhered to his position in Shaw, Rehnquist did not. In UJO, Rehnquist
joined with White in holding that a state can treat race just like it treats political party affiliation, a
position he arguably rejected in joining Justice O'Connor's opinion in Shaw.
In addition, Justice Rehnquist and other typically conservative Justices stretched the
concept of constitutional harm in voting rights cases beyond prior limits not only in voting rights
cases but in other cases in which citizen-plaintiffs have challenged government structures. See, eg.,
the discussion of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992), in Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,
Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J. 1141 (1993). They disregarded
their usual demand that the Court recognize only harms susceptible to being analyzed through
judicially manageable standards and capable of being redressed by meaningful remedies. See, eg.,
Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). Compare White's dissent in Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2834
n.l.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
60. 113 S. Ct. at 2844. Justice Stevens argued that the majority opinion is self-contradictory,
since Justice O'Connor stated that the Constitution imposes no independent requirement of
compactness or contiguity in districting. Id. A constitutional prohibition on artificial, general
government districts, however, does not necessarily translate into a constitutional requirement of
district compactness or contiguity. The constitutional prohibition simply invalidates structures
that intrinsically obstruct representative democracy.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 27-32.
62. Issacharoff, supra note 23, at 1873-76. As appropriated by liberals, Issacharoff argues, the
ideas tend to become unduly optimistic and naive. As appropriated by conservatives, the ideas are
used as a "shill for unchecked majoritarianism." Id. at 1878.
63. Se eg., THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY THE PouTIcs OF INITIATIVE,
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 7-20 (1989); GARRY Wius, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 42-
43, 223-24 (1981). Madison hoped representative government would minimize the divisive forces
of faction, which he defined as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majoniY or a minority
of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest,
adverse to the rights of other citizens or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community." Id. at 193-94 (emphasis added).
19931
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should guide official action.6 4  They are a necessary feature of a reciprocal rela-
tionship in which government's conferred powers to act for the general good (and
to demand support of all citizens) are balanced by the rights of all citizens to gov-
ernment access.65 They complement the idea that government is a trustee, acting
for the benefit of all the people, an idea widely accepted and incorporated into
state charters of government after the Revolutionary War.66 Ordinary people
"starved for unitary democracy" 67 and community understand the aspirations.
Finally, minority groups-which by definition do not constitute a majority politi-
cal bloc-have typically depended on the aspirations.
68
It is somewhat difficult to describe the constitutional aspiration in the opin-
ions of the dissenters. 69  Assuming that Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens
would each describe his aspirations as related to equality, the dissenting opinions
reveal several things. First, equality means different things to different people,
especially when equality is related to groups or when it may be construed to impli-
cate affirmative action. As a constitutional aspiration, therefore, it is arguably
weaker than the aspiration to representative government for the common good. If
an aspiration to political equality is to function vigorously in civil rights litiga-
tion, its content must be more clearly described.7 °
Second, the aspiration to equality did not neatly comport with what was at
stake for either the plaintiffs or for African-Americans in Shaw. The Shaw plain-
tiffs repeatedly said they were not concerned with equality. In addition, the North
Carolina districting scheme gave only two of twelve congressional seats to African-
Americans, a number hardly sufficient to constitute a strong faction, much less
equality within the state's congressional delegation. Thus, the equality aspiration
64. GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION -OF INDEPENDENCE 190,
215-16, 251-55 (1978). Compare the arguments of civic republicanism described in Cass R.
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE LJ. 1539, 1560-61 (1988).
65. See, e.g., Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1867) (because government has the power to act
for the benefit of the common good and to require all citizens to contribute to that action, some
rights are a necessary, equal, and reciprocal right of citizenship). Compare the special district cases
like Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981), in which the Court permits special districts to distribute the
franchise in unconventional ways because government powers of special districts are comparably
restricted. See supra note 55.
But see Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978). In Holt, persons living
outside municipal boundaries but subject to extraterritorial, city police jurisdiction unsuccessfully
argued that they should have municipal voting rights. The dissenters argued that the geographic
municipal boundaries delineated an artificial community and should not determine the outcome of
the case:
At the heart of our basic conception of a "political community" . . . is the notion of a
reciprocal relationship between the process of government and those who subject
themselves to that process by choosing to live within the area of its authoritative
application .... [The extraterritorial jurisdiction of the City of Tuscaloosa] fracture[s] this
relationship by severing the connection between the process of government and those
who are governed ....
Id. at 82 (Brennan, J., joined by White, J., & Marshall, J., dissenting).
66. HOFFER, supra note 5, at 78-79.
67. JANE MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADvERsARY DEMOCRACY 301 (1983).
68. In this regard, it is important to emphasize that the aspiration is not necessarily
assimilationist. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE U. 1493 (1988).
69. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
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functioned weakly in context.
Finally, the dissenting opinions assumed that an equality aspiration would
necessarily trump any other constitutional aspiration. They largely ignored the
constitutional aspiration on which the majority opinion rested. One may debate
whether District 12 actually causes the harms alleged, or whether-if they exist-the
harms must be tolerated because they are outweighed by compelling interests in
remedying effects of discrimination. One should not, however, peremptorily
reject either the plaintiffs' harms or the aspiration from which they derive.71 As
noted earlier, the aspiration is one on which minority groups have depended his-
torically. It may be especially. critical to minorities as a check against the intense
majoritarianism of policymaking by direct democracy, a device increasingly used
to make end runs around representative forms of government.
7 2
Aspiration is not, of course, the whole story in Shaw. Even a strong constitu-
tional aspiration must not be so divorced from the context of a specific case that
its invocation produces an outcome that perverts the very meaning of the aspira-
tion. The Shaw majority permitted aspiration to be used in this way. Certainly
many who are outraged by Shaw are reacting to the majority's apparent determina-
tion not to acknowledge the realities of the problem of race in this country.
70. Issacharoff, supra note 23, at 1880 provides an illustrative argument that links equality to
the aspirations on which the Shaw majority relied. Issacharoff proposes that majority-minority
districts may serve to reduce racial bloc voting and so tend to contribute positively to
representative government. This appears to have been Congress's attitude when it rejected
arguments that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act would result in racial polarization. Laughlin
McDonald, The 1982 Amendments of Section 2 and Minority Representation, in CONTROVERSIES IN
MINORITY VOTING, supra note 22, at 66, 74-79. In addition, some have argued that whether or not
majority-minority districts reduce racial bloc voting-which does persist-the districts promote
community by resulting in more inclusive government policies. Id. at 79 (summarizing social
science data); Bruce E. Cain, Voting Rights and Democratic Theory: Toward a Color-Blind Society?,
in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, spra note 22, at 261, 271.
To develop a satisfactory aspiration of equality, we will have to listen more carefully to minorities
themselves, and not dismiss their arguments out of hand. See eg, Guinier, supra note 22, arguing that
a strong conception of political equality for minorities will focus on the "'black voters' dignity,
autonomy, and interest in self-government as citizens in a democracy;" on "legislative influence, not
just legislative presence;" on the "extended political process;" and on "equal status for minorities as
full participants in the broad range of political decisionmaking in order to bring about fair results."
Id. at 287-88.
71. When Justice O'Connor expresses great concern that the challenged district will incite
racial hostility, reinforce racial stereotypes, and promote continued racial bloc voting, I must
confess that I am reminded of some colleagues who object to attempts to introduce diversity to the
curriculum, faculty, and student body on the ground that the attempts are divisive. Of course, the
attempts always seem to make women and minorities feel much more a part of community; only
those whose previous, privileged status is at risk see a threat to community. Nonetheless-as
amused and impatient as minorities or women may be by these grumblings-an aspiration to
community and government for the common good requires us to take into account the harms to
all members of the community.
One cannot a priori discount-eg., as Justice White does in refusing to address the harms
identified by O'Connor-the harms to community felt by those who are being asked to adjust to a
new political reality. Perhaps the alleged harms are entirely specious, but the plaintiffs insist that
they are not. Only a careful fact-based inquiry-which the Shaw dissenters would deny by refusing
to recognize even a cause of action-will provide a basis on which to make that judgment.
72. Cain, supra note 70, at 273. The current challenge to Colorado's anti-gay Amendment 2,
adopted through the direct democracy initiative process, relies on a variant of this constitutional
aspiration. A discussion of the aspiration and Amendment 2 as part of a Petitions Clause analysis
is contained in Emily Calhoun, Voice in Government: The People, NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PuB. POL'Y (forthcoming Spring 1994).
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
Whereas the dissenters in Shaw carefully described the reality of power, racial
politics, and resulting harms to African-Americans, the majority spoke primarily
in abstractions. As Randall Kennedy has said:
the ... majority [in Shaw] appeared captivated by the idea that purposefully
creating black majority districts "may balkanize us into competing racial
factions"-as if before affirmative race-conscious measures were introduced
the state's political arena was a Garden of Eden.
It was left to the dissenting Justices to observe that North Carolina had
traditionally been balkanized, with a white majority faction monopolizing
all the Congressional seats; that it was only after the 1990 redistricting that,
for the first time since the turn of the century, blacks were able to join the
state's Congressional delegation and that even after the creation of the two
black majority districts, whites remain a voting majority in 10 of the 12
Congressional districts.
73
Nothing in the majority opinion in Shaw responds to this reality. Worse, by
reserving questions in an inviting way74and by not clearly articulating the limited
basis for its holding,75 the majority opened up the possibility of challenges to
many majority-minority districts across the country. By unnecessarily and unreal-
istically exaggerating possible "balkanizing" impacts of District 12,76 the majority
did little to promote the constitutional aspiration invoked in its opinion.
Even if Shaw's decision to recognize the plaintiffs' harms was appropriate,
surely the Justices in the majority had an obligation to explain their decision in a
way that would honor the aspiration on which they based their holding. Surely
they had an obligation to make every effort to write an opinion that would not
exacerbate racial division and hostility in the name of promoting community.
Surely they might have spent as much time writing about the reality of the con-
cerns that resulted in the adoption of the Voting Rights Act as they spent respond-
ing dismissively to North Carolina's potential justifications for District 12.
Shaw v. Reno gives us a way of mapping the domain of civil rights litigation.
It locates aspiration and reality prominently within that domain, and also clearly
reveals the dangers that lie beyond its border.
73. Randall Kennedy, Still a Psgmentocracy, N.Y. TIMEs, July 21, 1993, at A17.
74. For example, Justice O'Connor stated that the Court was not deciding whether the
intentional use of race in all decisions involving the creation of majority-minority districts would
be constitutionally suspect, 113 S. Ct. at 2828, rather than stressing the unique nature of the
majority-minority district challenged in North Carolina. See supr note 32.
75. For example, the Court might have emphasized that a mere allegation that race has been
used as the sole criterion for districting is not enough to withstand a motion to dismiss given
Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), and might have reminded states that they are free to
contradict the basis of the complaint at the outset of litigation, as seems to have happened in
Wht.
76. See spra note 70.
77. 113 S. Ct. at 2830-32.
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Shaw sits perilously close to that dangerous border, for it remains to be seen
how the decision will be used. It is unclear whether the realities and equality aspi-
rations neglected by the Shaw majority will be given their due weight when the
merits of the controversy are addressed. It is unclear whether, because of Shaw,
Section 2 or 5 of the Voting Rights Act will be substantially undercut, or the abil-
ity of states to respond to the realities of racial bloc voting and racial discrimina-
tion significantly curtailed. It is unclear whether Shaw's constitutional voting
rights aspirations will be permitted to serve the interests of all members of the
political community, or will only be invoked to derail aspirations to equality.
Those of us who aspire to representative government that transcends adversarial,
power politics-but who also understand the discrepancy between that aspiration
and the reality of racial politics-wait hopefully but with considerable trepidation.

